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From an economic, social,  and political  perspective  we are at a cru-
cial decision  point in our policy  with respect to agriculture.  Our cur-
rent set of farm policies and programs  is based on the premise that in
the  1970s  the agricultural  economy  emerged  from  the  chronic  sur-
pluses of the 1950s and  1960s into a new economic  era of tighter  sup-
plies.  In  response  to the  changed  economic  conditions,  policies  were
redirected  from the price and income support-production  control poli-
cies  of the  1950s  and  1960s to the  export-oriented  price  and income
stabilization policies of the 1970s.  Export markets grew rapidly under
favorable demand expansion conditions.
Farmers responded to the resulting favorable  income conditions, al-
beit more  unstable  prices,  by  increasing  production.  The  quantity  of
resources committed to production,  including land, increased. Exports
expanded  to the  point  where  production  from  two  out  of every  five
cropland acres was sold abroad.  The world market became the prime
determinant  of the U.S. farm prices - both in level  and variability.
In the 1970s a new set of farm programs  added to the programs that
had been adopted over the previous two decades. This new farm policy
combination appeared to work reasonably well. One of the most critical
new policy tools, the farmer-owned  grain reserve,  accumulated  grain
at harvest. Within the next nine months, the price generally  rose suf-
ficiently that the grains in it could be marketed profitably  later that
year.  In  fact,  the  reserve  was  so dependable  in  hitting the  release
trigger that farmers began to look at it as a one year commodity loan
- much like the regular CCC price support loan.
It was suggested that the reserve entry price would become the price
floor  and the maximum  deficiency  payment  would  be the difference
between the target price and the reserve entry price. Commodity mar-
ket  analysts,  consultants,  and speculators  began  to plan  strategy  by
it. Some  economists may have  even based their outlook  on the antic-
ipated price impact of the reserve. There was nothing wrong with that
as long as the reserve  continued to work as intended.
In the  1980s,  the  roof fell  in on  most farmers,  on  economists  who
speculated  surpluses were at an end,  and on policymakers.  Two years
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owned grain reserve to capacity. In aggregate terms, nominal net farm
income  fell  to  about  where  it  was  during  the  1960s.  As  soon  as  it
became  evident  that this build-up of stocks was not just a temporary
aberration, political pressure began to build for help from Washington.
The  help  desired  from  some  producer-oriented  interest  groups  ap-
pears to be largely a return to the policies of the 1950s and 1960s. The
administration has been basically unsympathetic  to this  approach.  It
has been constrained  on ideological and political  grounds. That is, the
Reagan  administration  abhors  production  controls  - other  than  in-
effective acreage  controls - more than it dislikes increases in govern-
ment spending  for high deficiency payments  and expenditures  on the
farmer owned grain reserve. The administration may believe that only
ineffective production  controls are politically  acceptable.
The Supply-Demand  Balance  Issue
The policy direction chosen at this time should be heavily influenced
by the resolution of the current supply-demand balance  issue. That is,
did we  indeed in the late  1960s and  early  1970s make the transition
from  a  situation  of chronic  surpluses  to  a tighter  overall  supply-de-
mand balance or were the  1970s just an aberration?
If the  1970s  were just an aberration,  then we are  once again faced
with the  same set  of policy  issues that we  faced  two decades  ago.  If
not,  then  we  can  continue  to  hone  and fine  tune  our  current  set of
policies  and programs  to make them more  able to  deal with year-to-
year shifts in the  supply-demand  balance.
Policy analysts must first recognize that the supply-demand balance
issue  is not a domestic  issue. It is, instead a question  of whether the
productive  capacity of the world's farmers  is sufficient  to consistently
outrun  effective  demand  over  a  long  enough  time  period that  farm
prices and incomes are chronically  at unacceptably  low levels.
This is  a question  which cannot  be analyzed  by looking  strictly  at
domestic  stocks  and  observing  that the  carryover  of U.S.  grain  has
doubled  in the past two years  (Table  1).  Not only is  the time  period
too short to draw a  reliable  conclusion,  but  it is world  stocks  - not
U.S.  stocks - that are  the relevant  base for measurement  and  com-
parison. The decline and subsequent  increase in world carryover  as a
percent  of utilization  in Table  1  is  interesting,  but  inconclusive  in
terms of resolving the supply-demand  balance issue that gives rise to
the policy debate currently facing policy  analysts.
The  data  suggest  that world  carryover  stocks  have  increased  sub-
stantially from the  low levels of the mid-1970s but have not yet reached
the high levels that existed in the early 1960s. World stocks are, never-
theless high  and could  reach record levels with another year or two of
good crops and stagnant world economic conditions. It is, however, also
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Carryover as
percent of  U.S.  Carryover
Carryover  Utilization  utilization  as percent
Year  U.S.  World  U.S.  World  U.S.  World  of world
-------  -mmt- -------  ------- percent  -----  -
1960-61  197  832  24
1961-62  102  170  140  853  72  20  60
1965-66  59  143  150  957  39  15  41
1970-71  55  165  164  1,144  34  15  33
1975-76  37  138  155  1,232  24  11  27
1980-81  60  171  172  1,452  35  12  35
1982-83  123  238  186  1,479  66  16  52
Source: Foreign  Agricultural  Circular, and World Supply and Demand Estimates, USDA,
Washington, D.C.
important  to  note  the  sensitivity  of the stock  level  as  a  percent  of
utilization as  shown in Table  1.  In  1960 to  1961  world carryover  as a
percent of utilization  fell by four percentage points.  Such abrupt changes
have to be a major concern to U.S. policymakers who are continuously
under the watchful eye of those directly involved with issues of hunger
and malnutrition.
The  data  in  Table  1  make  another  important  point.  The  United
States is quite clearly  once again holding a disproportionate  share of
the  world grain  stocks.  This  large  share  of world  stocks  suggests  a
return  to, or continuation  of, the residual supplier status. This situa-
tion  can  be  attributed  directly  to government  policies  including  the
establishment of the  farmer-owned  grain reserve,  embargoes and  re-
lated activities.  These policies support the U.S. price while  sending a
message to foreign buyers that the United States is not a dependable
supplier.
The  supply-demand  balance  issue  is  a  complex  question  and  fun-
damental to the resolution of the current policy debate.  I believe there
was a shift toward a tighter supply-demand balance in the  1970s. The
current surplus conditions  can be explained by a convergence  of gen-
erally  favorable  production  conditions,  a  depressed  world  economy,
high interest  rates, and an increase  in the value  of the dollar.  Gov-
ernment  policy  must  bear  its share  of the  blame  for  creating  these
conditions.  Remember that the favorable  income conditions  of the 1970s
were, to an important  extent, the result of a rapidly expanding export
demand. When the rate of growth of export demand began to lag while
production  continued to expand,  stocks began to accumulate.
Those  who  were  expecting  utopian prices  and  incomes throughout
the  1980s  and  beyond  were  obviously  mistaken.  Periods  of surplus
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are  more likely than comparable  length periods  of deficit production.
Such a conclusion places inordinate demands  on both the policies  and
the policymakers.  Policy must,  under these conditions,  be sufficiently
flexible  to deal with both the surplus  and the deficit conditions.
The Policy  Alternatives and Their Consequences
While several farm policy alternatives could be discussed only three
will be treated here:
* A reversion to the policies  of the  1960s.
* A continuation  of current policies.
* Pursuit of a pure export  expansion policy.
Each will be discussed  assuming I have correctly  assessed the supply-
demand balance issue.  However, even  if there has been a reversion to
the chronic surpluses of the 1960s, this discussion is not without mean-
ing.  That  is, it provides insight into the magnitude  of the adjustment
required to revert back to the policies of that era.
A Reversion  to the 1960s
The  policies  of the  1960s  can  probably  best  be  characterized  as  a
mixture  of high  price supports,  production  controls,  and export  sub-
sidies.  Price supports were  high in the context  of the world price,  not
necessarily  producer  returns.  That  is,  exports  required  subsidies but
supports  were  not high enough  to generate  a farm  income  that was
anywhere  near  comparable  to  nonfarm  income.  Production  controls
were a combination  of allotment and longer-term land retirement pro-
grams  held  over  from the  1950s  and  modified  to  meet  political  and
economic  conditions  in the  1960s.
It is important to realize that a reversion to the policies of the 1960s
today has consequences  that extend beyond the impacts generally  as-
sociated  with these  policies  in the  1960s.  The  world along with U.S.
agriculture  has changed tremendously  since these policies were estab-
lished and subsequently  abolished.
The consequences  in terms of stabilization, capitalization of program
benefits and efficiency  still apply.  A new consequence  lies in the mag-
nitude  of adjustment  that would  be required.  In the  1960s there was
no  commercial  export  market  of significance  to  worry  about.  Today
the  production from two  out of every  five  acres  is exported.  It is eco-
nomic folly to think that it would be possible to cut back on production
without seriously jeopardizing  our position in the export market. This
is the case  for more than one reason.
* When  the  U.S.  is  controlling production,  our prices  would be ex-
pected  to be less  competitive in the world  market. The U.S. would  in
essence  be supporting  the price for the world.
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support the world price or isolate itself from the world market through
a system of import quotas  and export subsidies.
* Other countries  would respond to the  U.S. production  control ini-
tiative by increasing their own production.  This economically rational
reaction was experienced this past year when Canada overtly encour-
aged  its farmers  to expand  output.  A  comparable  reaction  likely  oc-
curred throughout  the world whether  by government  encouragement
or by economic  incentives.
* The U.S. economy is much more dependent on agricultural  exports
today.  Politically  it could not afford to subsidize  them while econom-
ically  it could not afford  to  give them  up because  of their balance  of
trade implications.
* As a leader  of the free world,  serious political consequences  could
result from  a  U.S. public  policy  error that resulted  in a  shortfall  in
the world  food  supply.  A policy  misjudgment  would  not be  as easily
explained or forgiven in the  1980s as it was in 1972.
It can be seen from even this cursory  review that major adjustments
would be required in the farm economy as well as the political economy
if a production control policy were to be vigorously pursued.  However,
the precise  magnitude of these adjustments  is difficult to predict and
could undoubtedly be the  subject of considerable  debate.
I doubt whether the USDA has either the fortitude  or the ability to
implement  an effective production  control program.  Don Paarlberg in
his two agricultural  policy books spends considerable time document-
ing the ineffectiveness of production control policies on the major com-
modities.  He  attributes this ineffectiveness  largely to a lack  of will.
Today, questions may also arise as to capability. These questions have
become particularly evident in the management  of the acreage  reduc-
tion program. The magnitude of slippage in the program raises serious
questions  regarding  USDA's  desire  and ability  to effectively  imple-
ment  a production  control program.
If forced to make a choice between allotments  with quotas and longer-
term land retirement  as a means of implementing  this alternative,  I
would  opt for  land retirement.  Even though the program  costs would
be higher, the voluntary nature of the program, its flexibility, and its
less obvious capitalization effects  make land retirement  programs ad-
vantageous. In addition and perhaps most important, history has taught
us that  allotment programs  are  extremely  difficult  to abandon  once
installed as  a policy  instrument.
Continuation of Current Policies
The biggest problem with  continuing  the current  policies  is  one of
explaining what our current policy is. At a recent Agricultural  Policy
Advisory Committee meeting in Washington, D.C., the discussion cen-
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policy.  While  export  expansion  has been  a  major  agricultural,  eco-
nomic,  and foreign policy  goal  of four  presidents, it has been subser-
vient to other foreign policy  goals on several  occasions.
Likewise,  our domestic  farm policy  has over time  increasingly  run
the risk of pricing U.S. farm products out of the world market. Specific
policies with this inclination include the maintenance of a high reserve
entry  and release  price  as  well  as  the propensity  of the  Congress  to
continuously increase  loan rates in the face  of low world prices.
Contributing  to the  problem  of defining  our policy  is  the adoption
of a highly  ineffective  set-aside  or acreage reduction  program.  While
program participation has been lower than justified by the benefits for
several  crops,  the rules by  which the program  operates  foster an un-
usually  high level  of slippage.  The  fault appears  to  lie  in  the rules
although  it may  also  lie  in  the  enforcement  of the  rules.  The  basic
problem  is a lack of a clear productivity requirement  on the land that
is set aside. As a result of only a previous  cropping requirement,  largely
unproductive  land  has  been  withdrawn  from production.  While this
policy has taken some land out of farming that should never have been
farmed,  it  has  not  reduced  production.  An  additional  example  that
facilitates  high slippage  is  allowing  the skiprow  in cotton  to qualify
as  set-aside acres.  Under the current acreage reduction  rules and en-
forcement policies,  one  should not anticipate a substantial  decline  in
production.
Is  there  any  reason  to  predict  1983's  paid  diversion  will  lead  to
different  results?  No,  not  as  long  as  the  rules  of the  game  are  the
same. An effective paid diversion would require that the land diverted
either be of average productivity  or that the payment be based  on the
productivity  of the land.  Neither of these requirements  is apparently
anticipated.
This raises  the interesting question  of how the Congressional  Budget
Office  could  have  concluded that  a paid diversion  would  reduce  gov-
ernment outlays on agriculture  in 1983. The diversion will not pay for
itself unless the rules of the game are changed.
A  continuation  of current  policies  could,  over  time  just as  surely
strangle our export market potential  as  the imposition  of production
controls - but without  any producer  benefits.  In reaction  to  lagging
exports  and  European  Community  export  subsidies,  there  is  consid-
erable  discussion of the use of export subsidies  by the United States.
Even  the Farm Bureau  has  endorsed  an  export  subsidy policy.  Most
of the talk has been about selective subsidies in those markets where
the United States has lost a substantial market share to the European
Community. However, serious question exists as to whether a selective
subsidy policy can be pursued without degenerating into a major trade
war.  Real  dangers exist  for farmers in the  current policy direction
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is no policy  or a policy  created by default.
Export Expansion  Policy
An  export  expansion  farm  policy  would  have  as  its  sole  objective
increasing  the  sales of farm products  abroad.  There  would be  no  as-
sistance to farmers except as it relates to foreign market development.
This  is the type  of policy  that  many  expected  for  agriculture  when
President  Reagan took  office.  It was the policy  espoused  by Secretary
Earl Butz.  Pursuit of a policy that was truly designed  to expand  ex-
ports would require several basic changes from the current U.S. policy.
These changes  include:
* A denial of the use of food as a tool of foreign policy except  in the
event  of a declared  war.
* Setting the price support level below the world market price.  This
policy  was  declared in  the  1977  farm  bill. The bill,  in fact, provided
that if the world market price came within  5 percent of the loan rate,
the loan rate would automatically be lowered. This was truly an export
oriented concept;  however, the Congress has had such a propensity to
raise  the  loan  rate that this  policy  has since  been  abandoned.  U.S.
loan rates  are  now  desperately  close  to  once  again  pricing  the U.S.
farmer out of the world market.
*  The denial  of the use  of production  controls  and the recognition
that these policy  tools are  inconsistent  with  an export oriented  farm
policy.
* The establishment  and funding of an export  credit policy that al-
lows the United  States to consistently  compete on credit terms in the
world market.  An export revolving fund may be a key to a consistent
export  policy.
Are such policy  initiatives politically  durable?  They may not be.  It
may  well  be  that the world food  supply-demand  balance  has not yet
tightened  sufficiently  to  allow  an export  oriented  farm  policy.  That
may be the lesson of the past decade.
Closing Observations
The  key to developing  a consistent  farm policy lies in a determina-
tion of where we are in the supply-demand balance.  If as some suggest
we  are still in a situation  of chronic  surpluses,  then efforts to  control
production  are  once  again  in  order.  At  the  other  end  of the  policy
spectrum  is the implementation  of a pure  export expansion policy.  In
between  lies a  myriad  of policy  options  all  of which  run the risk  of
jeopardizing  our competitive  position  in the  export market and thus
drive  policy  choices  back  toward  the production  control  alternative.
Those forces  are clearly  evident currently.
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ports  are  not  apparent  to many  who  would  prefer  to  revert  to the
policies  of the  1950s and  1960s. The issues involved are broader than
agriculture  because  of the  importance  of farm  exports  to the  overall
economy.  The burden falls  on us,  as policy  educators,  to make all in-
terest groups  aware of the nature of the issues,  the alternatives,  and
their consequences.
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